BIOECONOMIC MANAGEMENT OF RED SWAMP CRAYFISH (PROCAMBARUS CLARKII) IN THE PRESENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES by Junqueira-Lopes, Rui et al.
1
Marine Resource Economics, Volume 11, pp. 1–9 0738-1360/96 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the U.S.A.  All rights reserved.           Copyright © 1996 Marine Resources Foundation
Bioeconomic Management of Red Swamp Crayfish





University of Paris I, France
GILLES ROTILLON
University of Paris X, France
Abstract   Red swamp crayfish (Procambarus Clarkii) is a valuable renewable
resource which creates significant negative externalities to its environment.
Crayfish can cause severe crop damage by burrowing in fields and using irriga-
tion systems to spread. These crayfish are resistant to normal dosages of
pesticides which are harmful to fish and birds, can endure months of dryness,
and live in a low oxygen environment. This paper presents a simple bioeconomic
model for optimal use of the red swamp crayfish accounting for its value in con-
sumption, adapting Plourde’s (1970) model to include the negative externalities.
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Introduction
The red swamp crayfish, Procambarus clarkii, originated in Northeast Mexico and
the Central and Southern parts of the United States (Huner 1981). It has spread
throughout the world, with the exception of Australia and Antarctica (Huner 1981;
Laurent 1986; Hobbs 1989). This species’ adaptability to extreme changes in its en-
vironment is well documented. It is characterized by its ability to survive and repro-
duce in very different habitats. The speed of growth of this species under favorable
conditions is quite impressive.1
Red swamp crayfish is a renewable resource that creates a negative externality.
In the countries where the species is well established, it causes severe crop damage.
The rice fields of Japan, China, Spain, and Portugal are most greatly affected. The
species tends to live in lakes used for the irrigation of neighboring fields. It digs
burrows and invades fields used for dry crops, and it uses irrigation systems to
spread. These crayfish must be controlled because of the damage they cause and
their speed of reproduction. To make matters worse, farmers have become aware of
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the risks, and are using pesticides which are extremely harmful to fish and birds.
However, the crayfish are very resistant; it can endure months of dryness, live in a
low oxygen environment, and withstand normal doses of any pesticide.
Despite its negative impact, the crayfish are in great demand for their culinary
value. In fact, red swamp crayfish are widely consumed. Crayfish are also an inter-
mediate product used in manufacturing animal feed, drugs, and fish bait.
Our purpose in this paper is to present a simple model for optimal use of the red
swamp crayfish resource, accounting for both its value in consumption and the envi-
ronmental damage it causes. The next section presents Plourde’s (1970) model and
his results for the optimal use of a renewable resource without an externality. The
following section extends Plourde’s model by introducing a negative externality.
The optimal solution is derived and compared with Plourde’s solution. The final sec-
tion discusses management implications for red swamp crayfish.
Plourde’s Model
In Plourde’s model, the social planner is assumed to control the extraction and con-
sumption of the renewable natural resource to maximize the welfare function




∫ () –δ (1)
subject to the growth law of a renewable resource, Nt
˙ –– NN N C tt t t =λ ε 2 (2)
where λ  and ε  are given parameters and assumed to be constant over time. Nt repre-
sents the stock of the resource at time t. The discount rate δ  is strictly positive, and
U(Ct) is continuous, concave, and increasing as follows: U′ (Ct) > 0, U′′ (Ct) < 0 for
Ct > 0, U′ (Ct) →   +∞  as Ct →  0. As the limit of  ˙ NN  equals λ  when N tends towards
0, λ  can be understood as the intrinsic growth rate of the resource which is specific
to this species.2 With λ  > δ , the optimal solution is defined by N* = (λ  – δ )/2ε  and
p* = U′ (λ N* – ε N*2) where p is the shadow price associated with (2). As the golden
rule in the standard growth model, where δ  > 0, the maximum sustainable consump-
tion (defined by  ˙ N  = 0, N** = λ /2ε ) is not optimal. If λ  ≤  δ , the optimal solution
leads to the extinction of the resource.
Plourde’s Model With A Negative Externality Added
To account for the negative externality associated with the resource stock N, the cur-
rent social utility function takes the form
W(Ct, Nt) = U(Ct) – V(Nt) (3)
The increasing negative effect of N is represented by a convex loss function (V′  > 0,
V′′  > 0),which takes into account increasing damages due to the multiplying re-
2 We drop the subscript t to prevent confusion.Bioeconomic Management of Crayfish 3
source. The U(•) function has the same properties as above.




∫ (Ct, Nt)e–δ tdt (4)
Subject to (2) where δ  > 0 is the discount rate.
The species commonly inhabits agricultural irrigation systems which draw wa-
ter from a lake, river, or other water body. To control the crayfish in the irrigation
system, automatic catching devices are installed. The yield of the automatic catching
devices depends directly on the size of the stock of the resource inhabiting the sys-
tem and the supporting water body, such as a lake.
Let λ (N) represent the quantity caught by the automatic catching device, where
λ′  > 0. If this catching system is insufficient it may be necessary to fish directly in
the lake. Let c(t) represent the quantity caught by fishing on the date t. The catch is
assumed to be costless.3 Therefore, the quantity for consumption is the sum of the
quantities caught automatically and those fished directly, that is C = λ (N) + c. Con-
sumption, C, must be positive or zero, establishing a lower bound on the amount
fished directly, c. A negative catch rate, c < 0, means that some crayfish have been
released to the system. That is, it is possible to release the red swamp crayfish if
necessary (e.g. if automatic catching is too high).
As in Plourde’s model, when there is no human intervention the resource repro-
duces at a rate defined by  ˙ N  = F/(N), where F(N), natural reproduction, is equal to
λ N – ε N2. Thus, the population reproduces at an increasing rate for O < N < l/2ε , the
maximum being N = λ /2ε , and reproduction falls where λ /2ε  < N < λ /ε . Lastly, if
N > λ /ε , then  ˙ N  < 0 and the population will decrease. We assume that λ  > δ .
The problem of the social planner is to maximize




subject to the growth constraint
  ˙ N  = F(N) – γ (N) – c (6)
and the constraint on consumption,
C = γ (N) + c ≥  0 (7)
Solution of the Model
The Hamiltonian for the problem is
H = U[γ (N) + c] – V(N) + p[F(N) – γ (N) – c] (8)
where p is the shadow price of the resource. Denoting the partial derivative of the
Hamiltonian with respect to N as HN, we have:
3 In practice, it is possible to rely on those responsible for the upkeep of the irrigation systems or on
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˙ p = δ p – HN = δ p – U′γ′  + V′ (N) – p(F′  – γ′ ) (9)
The properties assumed for U(C) imply that the constraint C = γ (N) + c ≥  0 is not
binding at the optimum. As we are free to assume that c is interior (as it is possible
to affect C < 0), the maximization of the Hamiltonian with respect to the control
variable c, implies
U′ [γ (N) + c] = p (10)
Given the chosen specifications and the fact that γ (N) + c = U′ –l(p), the following
dynamic system is obtained:
˙ N  = λ N – ε N2 – U′ –1(p)( 1 1 )
˙ p = V′ (N) – p(λ  – δ  – 2ε N) (12)
The stationary equilibrium is defined by  ˙ N  = 0 and  ˙ p = 0. Writing  ˙ p = 0 is equiva-
lent to p = φ (N) = V′ (N)/p(λ  – δ  – 2ε N). The shadow price p is positive when N < N#
= (λ  – δ )/2ε  or the stationary equilibrium where there is no damage (V′  = 0). In the
range (0, N#), φ (N) is increasing and convex (φ′  > 0, φ′′  > 0). In addition, there is an
immediate negative or positive  ˙ p, depending on whether N is lower or higher than φ (N).
Finally,  ˙ N  = 0 is equivalent to p = U′ [F(N)] = U′ (λ N – ε N2), the derivative of
which is (λ  – 2ε N)U′′ , which is negative for N < λ /2ε  and positive if N > λ /2ε . The
change in the resource,  ˙ N , will be positive or negative depending on whether F(N)
is higher or lower than U′ –l(p), p being higher or lower than U′ [F(N)].
Figure 1 is thus obtained.
Demonstrating that the stationary equilibrium (N*, p*) is in fact a saddle point
is straightforward. To do this, the dynamic system is linearized around the equilib-
rium point. The M matrix associated with the linear system is:
















The determinant of M is –(λ  – 2ε N*)(λ  – δ  – 2ε N*) + (1 /U′′ )(V* + 2ε p*) which is
negative since N* is lower than N# and U′′  < 0. Consequently, the system allows for
two real eigenvalues of opposite signs, i.e. a saddle point.
Local Study of the Optimal Solution
The phase diagram has a standard economic interpretation. If N(0) < N* the resource
is rare, and a high implicit price must be attributed that decreases as the resource
stock increases. If N(0) > N*, a low implicit price is used. Besides this very general
qualitative description, there is no information on the evolution of the long-term op-
timal control. However, from this viewpoint we can clarify what happens close to
the stationary equilibrium (N*, p*). For this purpose, we study the optimal solution
in the proximity of the stationary equilibrium by explaining the solutions of the lin-
ear system.
The eigenvalues of the M matrix are:
µ  =  1
2 {Tr M + [(Tr M)2 – 4Det M]
12} (14)
and
µ′  =  1
2 {Tr M – [(Tr M)2 – 4Det M]
12} (15)
where Tr M and Det M are the trace and the determinant of the matrix M. We there-
fore have Tr M = δ  and, given that Det M is negative, µ  > 0 and µ′  < 0.
The general solution of the associated homogenous system is obtained by:
N(t) = A1eµ t + A2eµ′ t  and   p(t) = B1eµ t + B2eµ′ t (16)
The stable branch converging towards the stationary equilibrium implies that A1 = Bl
= 0, when N(t) = A2eµ′ t and p(t) = B2eµ′ t = –(µ′  – λ  + 2ε N*)A2eµ′ tU′′  are substituted in
the evolution equation of N. The general solution of the complete system is N(t) =
N* + A2eµ′ t; and p(t) = p* – (µ′  – λ  + 2ε N*)A2eµ′ tU′′  and as N(0) = No. We, therefore,
have A2 = N0 – N*.
We now go back to the expression of optimal control, c = U′ –l(p) – λ (N), by re-
placing p and N with the expressions above:
c(t) = U′ –1[p* – (µ′  – λ  + 2ε N*)(N0 – N*)]eµ′ tU′′  – γ [N* + (N0 – N*)eµ′ t]   (17)
Since
U′ [c + γ (N)] = p (18)
U′′ [ ˙ c + γ′ (N) ˙ N ] =  ˙ p = –µ′ (µ′  – λ  + 2ε N*)A2eµ′ tU′′
˙ c + γ′ (N)(µ′ A2eµ′ t) = µ′ (λ  – µ′  – 2ε N*)A2eµ′ t
˙ c = µ′ A2eµ′ t[λ  – µ′  – 2ε N* – λ′ (N)]Junqueira-Lopes, Michel, and Rotillon 6
and
A2 = N0 – N* (19)
then
˙ c = µ′ (N0 – N*)eµ′ t[λ  – 2ε N* – µ′  – γ′ (N)] (20)
Thus, there are two possibilities, depending on whether the marginal automatic
catch γ′ (N) is “low” or “high.” If γ′ (N#) < λ  – 2ε N* – µ′  (“low” marginal catch) near
N*,  ˙ c has the same sign as N* – Nt, whereas, if γ′ (N*) > λ  – 2ε N* – µ′  (“high” mar-
ginal catch) near N*,  ˙ c will have the same sign as Nt – N*.
We conclude that if the current stock is less than the steady state optimum
(N < N*), and if automatic catching is not strongly related to N, then fishing [c(t)]
should increase. This counter-intuitive result is a consequence of low automatic
catching. Therefore, assessment of the red swamp crayfish stock is needed to deter-
mine the optimal policy around the stationary equilibrium.
Comparison With Plourde’s Model
As many papers about renewable resources do, and for comparison with Plourde’s
model, we assume a Schaefer stock dynamic. In Plourde’s model, when δ  < λ  a
saddle point steady state is obtained. We will next show that taking into account the
negative externality of the resource does not modify the qualitative properties of
Plourde’s optimal solution. In particular, the monotone convergence condition to-
wards a steady state N* > 0 is unchanged when δ  < λ . The difference between our
solution and Plourde’s solution is the level of the resource in the steady state. In our




–– * λδ ε 2
 = U′ (λ N* – ε N*2) = U′ (C*) > 0 (21)
which is lower than Plourde’s steady state  Np * = (λ  – δ )/2ε .4 This results from the
effect of the damage caused by the crayfish.
Denoting pp as the shadow price and Cp as consumption in Plourde’s model, we
have pp > p which implies Cp < C.
Finally, (21) can be written as
′ VN (* )
2ε
 = U′ (C*)( Np * – N*) (21′ )
and we can see that when V′  tends to zero, N* tends to  Np *.5 Thus, Plourde’s model
is just a limiting case of our model, specifically when there is no damage. The quali-


















[( – ) / – *]
(* )
( * –* )
(* )




5 If λ  ≤  δ , the optimal solution in our model also leads to the extinction of the resource.Bioeconomic Management of Crayfish 7
tative properties of our solution are the same as in Plourde’s model. The only differ-
ence is the deviation due to the negative externality of the resource stock.
Near the steady-state for any level of stock, the optimal level of consumption is
lower in Plourde’s model than in our model. In the long run, the optimal level of
stock is also lower in our model than in Plourde’s model, and for this level, the
steady consumption will be lower too.
Management of the Resource for a Special Case
Junqueira-Lopes et al., (1992), study the problem of optimal extraction of the red
swamp crayfish without a negative externality or a linear utility function. In that pa-
per, the quota is constrained between 0 and an upper bound c′′ , given exogenously
by the policy makers. Because of the linear structure of the problem, the optimal so-






, p< = 1.
The welfare utility function is linear and equal to λ (N) + c. For simplicity we
assume γ (N) =  1
2 γ N2, V(N) =  1
2 dN2 and γ  < λ  and d > γ . The first inequality is justi-
fied by the rapid reproduction of the resource versus the quantity caught by the auto-
matic system, especially low N values where λ  is the intrinsic reproduction rate of
the resource [equal to F′ (0)]. The second inequality signifies that the damage is too
extensive to be eliminated by the automatic catching system alone; given that the
marginal damage, dN, is always higher than the marginal catch, γ N. Finally, we as-
sume that c is constrained to the range [c′ , c′′ ], where c′  < 0 and c′′  > 0. Under these
circumstances, the Hamiltonian equation is linear in c and is written as:
H =  1
2 γ N2 + c –  1
2 dN2 + p λε γ NN Nc –– – 2 1
2
2 [] (22)
and the following conditions are obtained:
˙ p = (d – γ )N – p(λ  – 2ε N – γ N – δ ) (23)
and
c* = c′  when p > l (24)
c* = c′′  when p < l
c′  < c* < c′′  when p = l.
As for the equation regarding the growth of the resource, it is obtained as follows:
˙ N  = λ N – ε N2 –  1
2 γ N2 – c. (25)
A dynamic system is obtained that allows the establishment of an optimal solution to
the problem which depends on the value of the implicit price of the resource p in
relation to 1.
Since the equation for the evolution of the implicit price is independent of c, it
follows that the curve is defined byJunqueira-Lopes, Michel, and Rotillon 8






λεγδ 2  = m(N). (26)
Therefore, p > 0 when N < N◊  = (λ  – δ )/(2ε  + γ ) and






λεγδ 2 2  > 0.
Finally, for p = l,  ˙ p = 0 for N = N~ = (λ  – δ )/(2ε  + d). The study of the curve de-
fined by  ˙ N  = 0 is more delicate and depends on the value of p.
When p > 1, c* = c′  and is equivalent to finding the solutions to the second de-
gree equation, λ N – ε N2 –  1
2 γ N2 – c′  = 0. The discriminant is positive and there is
only one N′  positive solution as c′  < 0. Thus,





Finally,  ˙ N  is positive for N > N′  and negative for N < N′ . If p < l, c* = c′′ , we
must now study the second degree equation, λ N – ε N2 –  1
2 γ N2 – c′′  = 0. Its discrimi-
nant is ∆  = λ 2 – 2c′′ (2ε  + γ ). If c′′  is sufficiently high, which is always possible as it
is selected in accordance with the rules, then ∆  < 0 and  ˙ N  will always be negative.
Finally, if p = l,  ˙ N  = λ N2 – ε N2 –  1
2 γ N2 – c = ρ (c) = 0 is a decreasing function of c
which describes the [N′ , 0] gap when c varies from c′  to c′′ . We thus obtain figure 2.
The economic interpretation of this diagram resembles the one set forth for fig-
ure 1. In this case, the rareness sign, provided by the implicit price of the resource,
Figure 2.  Optimal Solution Without a Negative Externality Given a Constrained Catch QuotaBioeconomic Management of Crayfish 9
is translated by an optimal policy of the “bang-bang” type. When p > l the red
swamp crayfish are thrown back in order to increase stock (c* = c′  < 0) and when p
< l the maximum authorized quota is caught (c* = c′′ ).
Conclusions
The results obtained here are very similar to those obtained by Junqueira-Lopes, et
al. (1992) for the “bang-bang” type control. The only difference is in relation to the
stationary equilibrium N~ = (λ  – δ )/(2ε  + d) of the resource which in this case is
lower than N◊  = (λ  – δ )/2ε . This difference is due to taking into account the environ-
mental damages caused by the resource, thus resulting in an obvious reduction in
stock.
In our general model, as in Plourde’s model, the value of the discount rate also
influences the solution. It can be shown that the higher the discount rate, the stron-
ger the preference for the present, the lower the stock of stationary equilibrium, and
the higher the implicit price of the resource. In addition, the total catch γ (N) + c de-
creases when the discount rate increases. However, we cannot determine the evolu-
tion of the optimal quota without resorting to additional hypotheses. There are two
effects, one due to the negative externality and another to the preference for the
present. These two effects imply a decrease in the optimal stock and a decrease of
the steady-state consumption.
Further extensions of this work could proceed in several directions. One of the
more interesting studies would be to explicitly model the interaction between the
crayfish stock and the crops that are damaged. This, however, could only be accom-
plished after the completion of further biological research because red swamp cray-
fish has not been extensively studied by biologists. So it is impossible for the mo-
ment to model explicitly the interaction between this species and the crops that are
damaged. Additionally there is a lack of data about the costs of damages. At the
present time, all that is known is that damage costs are increasing at an increasing
rate.
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